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Introduction
El Salvador’s Civil War, which lasted from 1979 to
1992, grew from a history of military coups oppressing
and terrorizing the country’s peasant population. Left-
wing guerrilla rebels, inspired by Marxist ideologies
and Catholic Liberation Theology, formed the Farabun-
do Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and waged
a bloody 12 year rebellion against the military juntas.
El Salvador’s close proximity to Cuba and Nicaragua
made the war a political issue for the United States.
Although the conflict was internal, President Ronald
Reagan saw the civil war through a Cold War lens.
Consequently, the first Reagan Administration funded
El Salvador’s Duarte Junta regime to quell the FMLN
rebels, who the administration labeled as communist
insurgents. 
President Reagan employed hardline rhetoric to
depict the United States as El Salvador’s protector
amidst the alleged threat of a communist movement.
Furthermore, the State Department stressed the
administration’s role of protecting democracy and
security in El Salvador. Secretary of State Alexander
Haig stated that the U.S. government’s role in aiding
the Duarte military coup was, “first, to reaffirm and
promote democracy; second, to create new economic
opportunity; and third, most urgently, to oppose
74 Historical Perspectives September 2015
interventionism.”1 Assistant Secretary of State Thomas
O. Enders described the U.S. aid as equipping its ally
with proper defense; doing so supposedly furthered
democratic ideals, but the junta’s military and para-
military murders demonstrated neither defense nor
democracy.2 In fact, the Salvadoran Army used much
of its U.S. training and funding to kill thousands of
noncombatants. However, to maintain the Reagan Cold
War doctrine, the State Department and the U.S.
Embassy argued that no evidence could prove the
junta’s massacres, and any sources that said other-
wise were not to be trusted. This paper argues that the
Reagan Administration worked this message through
Congress and the American public by denying or
hiding the facts and manipulating the press. It will
examine the Salvadoran Army’s largest orchestrated
killing of the civil war at El Mozote. It will then analyze
the conflict between reports by the free press and
human rights organizations versus the reports by the
U.S. Embassy and State Department.   
The El Mozote Massacre and its Press Coverage
On December 11, 1981, the Salvadoran Army’s U.S.
trained Atlacatl Battalion ravaged the town of El
Mozote, torturing and slaughtering between 700 and
900 peasants, including women and children. About
500 of the victims were residents of El Mozote proper,
and the rest were civilians from nearby villages, such
      1 Enrique A. Baloyra, “Central America on the Reagan
Watch: Rhetoric and Reality,” Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs, 27, no. 1 (February 1985): 36. 
      2 Ibid, 36-37.
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as La Joya and La Ranchería.3 Those who left their
homes and fled to El Mozote tried to escape the
Salvadoran Army’s winter military sweep, misleadingly
titled Operación Rescate, “Operation Rescue.”  
On January 27, 1982, Raymond Bonner and Alma
Guillermoprieto published articles on El Mozote for the
New York Times and Washington Post, respectively.
They had traveled to Mozote via FMLN escorts on
January 6 of 1981. The trip commenced after the
FMLN guerrillas had regained control of El Mozote’s
surrounding Morazán province. Consequently, the two
journalists witnessed and photographed the charred
skulls, decaying bodies, and rotting animal flesh that
smothered the ground at Mozote. In her article,
Guillermoprieto wrote, “Here, the houses also were
gutted and looted, but the overwhelming initial impres-
sion was of the sickly sweet smell of decomposing
bodies. This was Mozote… inside, the stench was
overpowering, and countless bits of bones –skulls, rib
cages, femurs, and a spinal column –poked out of the
rubble.”4 Bonner also interviewed a survivor of the
carnage, Rufina Amaya, who provided valuable insight
into the Salvadoran Army’s systematic torturing and
killing of the villagers. Residents from outlying towns,
who lost friends and relatives in the attack, put the
number dead at 733.5 The massacre proved to be one
of the army’s most atrocious crimes committed during
      3 Alma Guillermoprieto, “Salvadoran Peasants Describe
Mass Killing; Woman Tells of Children’s Death” Washington Post.
January 27, 1982.
      4 Ibid.
      5 Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit, (New York: Times
Books, 1984), 343
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the Salvadoran Civil War; but the Reagan Administra-
tion would deny the reliability of the New York Times,
Washington Post, and other institutions that reported
on such war crimes.
Raymond Bonner and Alma Guillermoprieto pub-
lished evidence of the Mozote slaughter at a pivotal
moment for the administration, as their articles
appeared one day before President Reagan certified
military aid before Congress. The certification was
based on the 1981 Congressional amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.6 The reason why
Congress had amended the act was to curtail the
Duarte Junta’s noncombatant killings that occurred as
early as 1980. The murder of 4 American nuns on
December 6, for instance, had raised concerns about
the U.S.’s “friendly,” ally Salvadoran government.7 The
aid amendment allowed military funding to El Salvador
every six months only if the president certified that the
government was improving on human rights.8 The
Mozote incident indicated that human rights did not
improve, but pressure from the Reagan Administration
swayed the U.S. Embassy to deny that a massacre
occurred.          
Ambassador Hinton’s Version
On December 15, 1981, Reverend William L.
      6 Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads:Congress, the President, and
Central America, 1976-1993, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 12-13
      7 Clifford Krauss, “How U.S. Actions Helped Hide El
Salvador Human Rights Abuses,” The New York Times, (March
21, 1993), 1. 
      8 Bonner, 343.
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Wipfler, Director of Human Rights of the National
Council of Churches in New York, received word of the
El Mozote incident from San Salvador’s Archbishopric
and human rights institutions. Wipfler messaged
Deane Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, on
December 15, 1981 asking for a confirmation of the
massacre. Hinton then messaged a copy of his re-
sponse to Wipfler’s telegram and Wipfler’s original text
to the U.S. State Department. Wipfler’s text stated that
military and security forces had killed about 900
civilians in the Morazán province. Additionally, Wipfler
desired Hinton to “confirm or otherwise” the claim.9 In
response, Hinton claimed that he could not confirm
the assertion and questioned the validity of Wipfler’s
sources, which are not identified in Wiplfer’s original
message. Moreover, Hinton identified the embassy’s
only sources of the incident as testimonies from Radio
Venceremos, the revolutionary, underground, and pro-
guerrilla radio network that accompanied the FMLN
rebels. The network was known for reporting govern-
ment war crimes and criticizing the U.S. for its involve-
ment in the war. Consequently, Hinton discredited
Radio Venceremos to maintain the administration’s
portrayal of its ally, the Salvadoran government.
Acknowledging the massacre would have challenged
its image, potentially heightening public disapproval of
U.S. military funding. After all, Reagan had removed
      9 Deane Hinton, “TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7346: Alleged
Morazan Massacre”, U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, (January 8,
1982); obtained from the National Security Archive,
https://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/1679131
991?accountid=13679.  
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Robert White, Hinton’s predecessor, from El Salvador
because White actually reported on the military and
paramilitary’s human rights abuses; he did not fit the
administration’s framed foreign policy agenda.10 
The January 27 Times and Post articles contra-
dicted Hinton’s message; with their vivid images and
testimony reaching the eyes of the American public,
the State Department would have to defend Reagan’s
aid certification to Congress on February 2, 1982. The
House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
chaired by Democratic Representative Michael Barnes,
asked for an explanation for certifying military aid to
the junta in light of recent accounts of a massacre. 11 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Thomas Enders, would speak to the committee in
defense of the certification.
An Unsuccessful Investigation
As of January 27, the State Department had no
immediate data on Mozote to counter the Times and
Post reports. Since Ambassador Hinton lacked any
factual accounts of his own, the State Department sent
two military officers, Todd Greentree and John McKay,
to Morazán on January 30, 1982. There, they were
assigned to question Colonel Domingo Monterrosa’s
Atlacatl Battalion, which was responsible for the
alleged massacre.12 Additionally, the Americans were
to enter Mozote and investigate to provide the State
Department with more facts. Expectedly, the Atlacatl
      10 Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of
the Cold War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 116.
      11 Arnson, 87.
      12 Danner, 111-112.
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Battalion’s soldiers and commanding officers dodged
the Americans’ questions regarding the incident. The
only substantial response was that rebels had estab-
lished a defensive position to combat the government
troops, which possibly caught nearby civilians in a
crossfire. As a result, Greentree and McKay gathered
no firsthand information that explained who con-
ducted the military operation in Mozote or how many
civilians died. 
After the failed interviews, Greentree and McKay
traveled with one of the battalion’s squads into neigh-
boring villages, including Jocoaitique and La Joya, to
question the locals about El Mozote. In an interview
with Mark Danner, author of The Massacre of El
Mozote (1994), Mckay explained, “You could observe
and feel this tremendous fear. I was in Vietnam, and I
recognized the ambience. The fear was overriding and
we sensed it and could tell that that fear was not
instilled by the guerrillas.”13 The villagers dreaded the
army and refused to speak about El Mozote, fearing for
their lives. Danner also interviewed Greentree, who
added, “Each person I talked to confirmed the impres-
sion that something bad had happened, but nobody
was willing to go ahead and give the exact story.”14
Lastly and most importantly, when the two officers and
Salvadoran soldiers drove towards El Mozote proper,
the soldiers refused to take the Americans into the
town’s limits. The reason was that FMLN rebels had
retaken the village after the Atlacatl Battalion finished
its gruesome military operation. 15 Monterrosa’s troops
      13 Ibid, 107-109.
      14 Ibid, 109.
      15 Ibid, 109.
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feared they would encounter enemy combatants. As a
result, Greentree and McKay had to choose between
entering Mozote without protection or heading back
without an actual investigation; they chose not to
enter and they returned to the U.S. Embassy.   
McKay informed Mark Danner that he and
Greentree “didn’t want to find that anything horrible
had happened.” 16 Moreover, McKay explained how
avoiding a Mozote investigation proved detrimental to
their reporting.17 Had the officers discovered evidence
of a killing, they would have had to present conten-
tious information before Deane Hinton and then the
Department of State. In his interview with Mark
Danner, Greentree explained that “what the Embassy
had to say about that event had to be very carefully
phrased and controlled, to get as close as possible to
what happened and as far away as possible from
propaganda on either side.”18 Indeed, the purpose of
sending the officers to investigate was to provide the
Embassy and the State Department with facts to back
up Thomas O. Enders’s certification defense to Con-
gress. However, information confirming a massacre
would have exposed the disingenuousness of the
administration’s human rights statement, thereby
weakening Enders’s defense. Therefore, Hinton had to
omit such evidence yet explain to some degree what
happened at El Mozote. Ultimately, Hinton felt pres-
sure to present a story compatible with the Administra-
tion’s portrayal of the Salvadoran military. Reagan sent
a clear message not to smear the administration or the
      16 Ibid, 107.
      17 Ibid, 110.
      18 Ibid, 117.
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Duarte Junta when he replaced Ambassador White
with Hinton in early 1981. White had spoken against
the military’s dirty murders, most notably the deaths
of the American churchwomen in 1980, so removing
him set a precedent for Hinton to stay relatively quiet.
19
One day after the “investigation,” Ambassador
Hinton revised Todd Greentree’s report before cabling
it to the State Department. The report stated that in
light of the McKay-Greentree “investigation”, the
embassy could not confirm or disconfirm that the
Atlacatl Battalion employed excessive violence against
El Mozote’s civilian population.20 Additionally, the
report asserted that civilian death figures did not
approach numbers cited by independent sources, such
as the National Council of Churches and the articles
by Bonner and Guillermoprieto. Ultimately, the Em-
bassy cited no conclusive evidence; and no “investiga-
tion” of Mozote took place. In this context, a lack of
adequate evidence was sufficient to say that nothing
happened. Additionally, omitting the fact that the
officers never entered Mozote proved essential for
discrediting other sources that cited high death tolls at
El Mozote.
Manipulating the Facts and Defending Military Aid
The Greentree cable report formed the core of the
      19 Arnson, 42-43
      20 Todd Greentree and Deane Hinton, “TO SECSTATE
WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7665: CONFIDENTIAL”, U.S.
Embassy in San Salvador, (January 30, 1982); obtained from
Danner, 195
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State Department’s framing of the Mozote massacre.
On February 2 1982, the House Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs questioned Thomas
Enders, Assistant Secretary of State, seeking an
explanation for the administration’s certification of
military aid to El Salvador in light of the government’s
human rights abuses. The amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Law permitted military funding only if El
Salvador was “making a concerted and significant
effort to comply with internationally recognized human
rights.”21 Thus, Thomas Enders commenced the
hearing by acknowledging the generally poor human
rights situation in El Salvador, but added that the law
did not require that human rights problems be elimi-
nated. He added that the law required “progress.” By
stressing the word of the law, Enders set safe parame-
ters in which his argument against the massacre,
which lacked hard evidence, could fare somewhat well.
Next, Enders stated that accurate facts were “hard to
establish,” yet claimed,
Seventy percent of the political murders known
to our embassy were committed by unknown
assailants. And there is much special pleading
going on also in this. For example, many of you
have read about something called the Legal Aid
Office of the Archbishopric –Socorro Judico is
its Spanish name; it is often cited in the inter-
national media. It strangely lists no victims of
guerrilla and terrorist violence. Apparently they
do not commit violence.22
      21  Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; obtained from Arnson,
86.
      22  Danner, 209.
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      21  Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; obtained from Arnson,
86.
      22  Danner, 209.
10
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 20 [2015], Art. 9
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol20/iss1/9
A War Against the Facts and the Press 83
The fact that seventy percent of murders had unknown
culprits could not be confirmed because accurate facts
were “hard to establish”. The point of the arbitrary
figure was to dissuade any suspicions that El Salva-
dor’s military and paramilitary troops had committed
a large number of atrocities in 1981. Downplaying the
Duarte Government’s violence supported the State
Department’s argument that the civil rights situation
would be worse if the junta fell to leftist rebels. Accord-
ing to the Reagan Administration, the FMLN insur-
gents posed the true threat to security and were
therefore more guilty of war crime. Enders also criti-
cized the Human Rights Commission for having “no
independent information-gathering capacity” just
because its reports matched closely to the figures of
Raymond Bonner, Alma Guillermoprieto, Radio
Venceremos, and the National Council of Churches. 23
Since the embassy and the State Department labelled
these sources “guerrilla friendly,” Enders argued that
any casualty numbers resembling figures from such
sources were unreliable. 
Enders presented more fabrications to the commit-
tee, including a claim that the New York Times and
Washington Post’s death counts, 733 and 926 respec-
tively, were exaggerated because Mozote contained
only 300 residents during the military operation.
Therefore, although some misdemeanor occurred at
Mozote, the event could not have resembled a signifi-
cant killing. In a letter to Representative Richard L.
Ottinger, the State Department went further by argu-
ing that Bonner’s list of 733 casualties was compiled
      23 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
July 1993, p. 59-60; obtained from Danner, 222.
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of names stolen from civil registries of Jocoaitique, a
nearby town.24 The letter asserted that when FMLN
rebels captured Jocoaitique on February 12, they took
the names from its civil registries and created a list of
alleged victims of a massacre. In reality, Bonner
received the list of the 733 victims from local villagers
days before the Jocoaitique raid, ruling out State
Department’s claim completely.25 Thus, the State
Department outright lied to Ottinger, a faulty tactic,
but a tactic nonetheless. 
Enders continued proposing vague, and even
contradictory information regarding levels of noncom-
batant violence in El Salvador. To prove general
progress in human rights he proclaimed, 
The figures show it. We have September, Octo-
ber, November, December figures for 1980
which show something on the order of 800, 779,
575, 665 political murders. That is for 1980. We
have the same figures for this year [1981] which
show September 171, October, 161, November,
302. It shows December, 200. Our returns are
showing markedly different numbers on the
same methodology.26 
In this statement, Enders failed to cite any sources the
State Department used to confirm the decline in
political murders from 1980 to 1981, and if this
testimony included the more accurate number of dead
      24 Ibid.
      25 Bonner, 343.
      26 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
obtained from Danner, 212.
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at Mozote, the December figures would range closer to
between 700 and 900. Furthermore, the State Depart-
ment’s proclaimed “methodology” was unclear. No
wonder Enders’s subsequent statement held that
nobody had a “complete report,” reflecting the Em-
bassy and State Department’s failure to find concrete,
qualified evidence that could challenge the alarming
press releases and reports by human rights organiza-
tions. 
Representative Gerry E. Studds quoted from one of
these reports written by Amnesty International. The
report stated that Salvadoran security forces had been
conducting human rights abuses on a “massive scale.”
Furthermore, the abuses constituted a “gross and
consistent pattern of human rights abuses.”27 Studds
then contrasted this warning with President Reagan’s
certification reassurance: “Statistics compiled in El
Salvador indicate decreased abuses by security
forces.”28 In response, Enders said that the presiden-
tial certification was not an “expression of satisfac-
tion”29; moreover, Enders admitted that there was a
substantial amount of violence, yet insisted that El
Salvador was improving its human rights record.
Again, he was trying to defend the Administration’s
certification on the basis that civilian casualties
persisted, but in smaller numbers, which apparently
defined progress.30 Enders still rested on the assump-
tion that atrocity reports about El Mozote were unreli-
      27 Ibid.
      28 Danner, 214.
      29 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
59-60.
      30 Arnson, 88.
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able.  
Finally, Representative Solarz demanded a list of
the embassy’s sources to support the supposed drop
in civilian casualties from 1980 to 1981. Enders
replied, “Each week the Embassy does collect evidence
which comes from a number of sources. Radio
Venceremos is one. Local press reports of deaths are
another. Local radio reports, other reports that are
available through the Government sources.”31 The
Embassy and State Department had previously de-
clared Radio Venceremos untrustworthy because of its
association with the communist labeled FMLN rebels,
yet Enders referred to the radio station as an Embassy
source. He resorted to it because he had no other
facts, except for rightist Salvadoran government
sources, which typically hid or under calculated
peasant death tolls.32 When confronted, Enders dodged
Solarz’s questions, and Solarz reminded him that
Amnesty International, the Archbishopric of San
Salvador, the Central American University, and every
other organization that reported on El Salvador’s
human rights situation held that the country’s killings
were above the level that existed in 1980; whereas the
Embassy and State Department claimed it had de-
clined.  
Ender’s last resort to prove a decline in murders
was to frame a misleading interpretation of human
rights sources. He maintained that even their facts
confirmed a reduction in abuses. He said,
      31 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
59-60.
32  Bonner, 342.
13
Navarro: A War Against the Facts and the Press
Published by Scholar Commons, 2015
A War Against the Facts and the Press 85
at Mozote, the December figures would range closer to
between 700 and 900. Furthermore, the State Depart-
ment’s proclaimed “methodology” was unclear. No
wonder Enders’s subsequent statement held that
nobody had a “complete report,” reflecting the Em-
bassy and State Department’s failure to find concrete,
qualified evidence that could challenge the alarming
press releases and reports by human rights organiza-
tions. 
Representative Gerry E. Studds quoted from one of
these reports written by Amnesty International. The
report stated that Salvadoran security forces had been
conducting human rights abuses on a “massive scale.”
Furthermore, the abuses constituted a “gross and
consistent pattern of human rights abuses.”27 Studds
then contrasted this warning with President Reagan’s
certification reassurance: “Statistics compiled in El
Salvador indicate decreased abuses by security
forces.”28 In response, Enders said that the presiden-
tial certification was not an “expression of satisfac-
tion”29; moreover, Enders admitted that there was a
substantial amount of violence, yet insisted that El
Salvador was improving its human rights record.
Again, he was trying to defend the Administration’s
certification on the basis that civilian casualties
persisted, but in smaller numbers, which apparently
defined progress.30 Enders still rested on the assump-
tion that atrocity reports about El Mozote were unreli-
      27 Ibid.
      28 Danner, 214.
      29 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
59-60.
      30 Arnson, 88.
86 Historical Perspectives September 2015
able.  
Finally, Representative Solarz demanded a list of
the embassy’s sources to support the supposed drop
in civilian casualties from 1980 to 1981. Enders
replied, “Each week the Embassy does collect evidence
which comes from a number of sources. Radio
Venceremos is one. Local press reports of deaths are
another. Local radio reports, other reports that are
available through the Government sources.”31 The
Embassy and State Department had previously de-
clared Radio Venceremos untrustworthy because of its
association with the communist labeled FMLN rebels,
yet Enders referred to the radio station as an Embassy
source. He resorted to it because he had no other
facts, except for rightist Salvadoran government
sources, which typically hid or under calculated
peasant death tolls.32 When confronted, Enders dodged
Solarz’s questions, and Solarz reminded him that
Amnesty International, the Archbishopric of San
Salvador, the Central American University, and every
other organization that reported on El Salvador’s
human rights situation held that the country’s killings
were above the level that existed in 1980; whereas the
Embassy and State Department claimed it had de-
clined.  
Ender’s last resort to prove a decline in murders
was to frame a misleading interpretation of human
rights sources. He maintained that even their facts
confirmed a reduction in abuses. He said,
      31 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
59-60.
32  Bonner, 342.
14
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 20 [2015], Art. 9
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol20/iss1/9
A War Against the Facts and the Press 87
The totals are different, but the trends are the
same. If you look at the trends in the legal aid
office, and I pointed out to you earlier some-
thing about its own tilt, you will find the same
downward trend. That is true of the statistics
collected by the Central American University,
but again it has a particular prejudice. They all
show this downward trend during the year.33
The “particular prejudice” was that the Central Ameri-
can University, like the New York Times, Washington
Post, San Salvadoran Archbishopric, and Amnesty
International, was not affiliated with the Reagan
Administration or the Salvadoran government. More-
over, arguing that the Central American University was
biased only emphasized that its figures (and those of
the other mentioned human rights institutions) did not
indicate a decrease in noncombatant deaths. When
Congressman Solarz asked what percentage of killings
were actually conducted by El Salvador’s armed forces,
the Assistant Secretary of State replied, “We are not
able to attribute very many of those deaths to one side
or the other, and we are not sure even of those that are
attributed whether they make sense or not.”34 In other
words, the State Department did not know how many
murders were performed by government forces, and
therefore could not have been able to confirm a reduc-
tion in human rights misconduct. Ironically, Enders
assigned a bias to every source except for the State
Department, which presented the vaguest and least
      33 “Report of the Secretary of State’s Panel on El Salvador,”
obtained from Danner, 212-213.
      34 Ibid.
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dependable information. In view of numerous,
publically available human rights accounts, the
Reagan Administration would need some help from the
press to combat the reports that revealed the junta’s
brutal murders.        
Right Wing Media Steps In
On February 10 of 1982, the administration
friendly Wall Street Journal published an editorial
titled “The Media’s War,” in which it attacked Raymond
Bonner for being “overly credulous” in accepting the
peasants’ accounts of a slaughter in El Mozote.35 The
Journal also quoted Guillermoprieto, who wrote that
she and Bonner had been escorted by FMLN rebels
with the purpose of showing their control of the region
and showing evidence of a massacre. Therefore,
according to the Journal, the point of showing remains
to the journalists was to spread leftist, pro-guerrilla
propaganda. This assertion implied that the Times and
Post’s journalists, the only Americans who actually
reported on the scene in Mozote, could not be trusted.
The editorial closely followed the administration’s
language on El Salvador’s violence. For example, it
criticized Bonner and Guillermoprieto for a having a
left leaning bias, the same bias, or “prejudice” that the
State Department referred to when discrediting
sources on El Mozote and other massacres. In fact, it
specifically defended Assistant Secretary of State
Enders, confirming that El Mozote’s population was
only 300 before the massacre.36 Additionally, the
      35 George Melloan, “The Media’s War”, Wall Street Journal,
(February 10, 1982). 
      36 Ibid.
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Journal restated confidently that Mozote witnessed no
systematic killing of its population, but instead a
“military operation,” which matched the testimonies of
the Atlacatl Battalion soldiers and the embassy.37 
The Wall Street Journal’s pro-administration
support suggested that the Reagan Administration
pressured its ally newspaper into denouncing Bonner
and Guillermoprieto; for example, the Journal attacked
Bonner’s supposed bias by smearing the reputation of
the New York Times as a whole: 
Realistically, neither the press nor the State
Department has the power to establish conclu-
sively what happened at Mozote in December,
and we’re sure the sophisticated editors of the
Times recognize as much. Yet as an institution,
their paper has closed ranks behind a reporter
out on a limb, waging a little campaign to
bolster his position by impugning his critics. A
news analysis charged the government of sow-
ing confusion by questioning press reports
without presenting detailed evidence to support
its position. The analysis posed the question of
how American diplomats gather information
abroad, but not the same question about Ameri-
can reporters.38 
Arguing that the State Department and the press were
equally incapable of confirming what occurred sug-
gested that they both cited equally inconclusive
information. However, The New York Times and Wash-
      37 Ibid.
      38 Ibid. 
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ington Post correspondents wrote more plausible
accounts using onsite evidence. In Mozote, Bonner and
Guillermoprieto saw the corpses firsthand and in-
cluded photographs of them in their respective articles.
Yet the Journal editorial contended that the reporters’
method of gathering information abroad was fraudu-
lent. Furthermore, claiming that Bonner went “out on
a limb” suggested that he was practically alone in
defending his evidence of the massacre. On the con-
trary, Radio Venceremos, Amnesty International, the
Archbishopric of San Salvador, the National Council of
Churches, and the other reporting organizations not
affiliated with the Reagan Administration presented
figures compatible, if not larger than those of Bonner.39
Consequently, the State Department stood “out on a
limb” trying to defend itself against the House Sub-
committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, which
referred to these organizations’ reports. The State
Department and U.S. Embassy stood alone, which was
all the more reason to entreat the Wall Street Journal
to defend the administration’s stance.      
Time magazine joined the criticism on March 29,
1982, calling Bonner “the most controversial reporter
on the scene” in its article titled “War as a Media
Event.”40 On June 18, two representatives from the
conservative media-watch organization called Accuracy
in Media (AIM) met with the publisher of the New York
Times to file a complaint on Bonner’s reporting.
Additionally, it dedicated almost an entire issue of its
twice-a-month AIM Report to criticizing Bonner. The
      39 Danner, 125.
      40 William A. Henry III, "War as a Media Event," Time, 29
March 1982, 75.
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report noted that AIM representatives,
focused especially on the January 28 story
alleging that government troops had massacred
either 733 civilians or 926, depending on whose
figures you accepted. We noted that these were
uncorroborated claims made by the guerrillas.
The State Department had pointed out that the
population of the village where the massacre
allegedly occurred was only 300, and many of
them were still there, alive and well. This was
covered in the AIM Report of February-II.41
 
Like the Wall Street Journal, AIM reiterated what the
State Department told Congress and supported End-
ers’s false assertions. For instance, Bonner did not
receive the “uncorroborated claims” (the death figures)
from guerrilla rebels, but instead from local villagers
living in nearby towns like La Joya and La Ranchería.
Additionally, the State Department’s claim that Mozote
had only 300 residents was misleading because Rufina
Amaya, the lone survivor from Mozote proper, stated
that about 500 people lived there.42 Moreover, the
massacre included the deaths of peasants who fled to
Mozote from nearby hamlets. Equally misleading,
“alive and well” implied high morale and an absence of
civilian causalities; but in the nearby hamlets, John
McKay and Todd Greentree had tried questioning
individuals, whose reluctance to disclose any knowl-
edge about Mozote reflected a general fear of an
      41 Reed Irvine, “The Ray Bonner Division,” Accuracy in
Media, July 1982, 1.
      42 Guillermoprieto, 2.
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oppressive military. The AIM Report also used Presi-
dent Reagan’s hardline, anticommunist language. The
organization said that one of Bonner’s goals was to
"discredit the government and the military forces that
were standing in the way of a communist takeover of
El Salvador."43 Similar rhetoric hinted that Reagan and
his administration officials were working directly or
indirectly with the supportive right wing press to
counter reports of human rights abuses. 
Ambassador Hinton also contributed to the Bonner
attack when he met with Abraham M. Rosenthal, who
was the executive editor of the New York Times, in
April. Ambassador Hinton expressed his disapproval of
Bonner’s aggressive journalism.44 Hinton also met with
reporters and accused Bonner of being an “advocate
journalist” for the rebel cause. Hinton’s complaints
gave the final blow to Bonner and The New York
Times’s reputation.45
Bonner Put at Odds with The New York Times
Six months after the Wall Street Journal opened
the criticism of Bonner, A. M. Rosenthal removed
Bonner from El Salvador, instructing him to return to
the Metro desk in New York. The Times seemed to have
succumbed to government pressure, explaining
Bonner’s withdrawal. Rosenthal’s public excuse for
removing Bonner was that he apparently had never
      43 Irvine, 2.
      44 John F. Kirch, “Raymond Bonner and the Salvadoran
Civil War: 1980 to 1983”, Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication in Toronto, Canada, August 2004, 3-4
      45 Bernard Weinraub, "Envoy Says Salvadoran Plan Is
Intact," New York Times, 12 June 1982, 3.
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Bonner’s aggressive journalism.44 Hinton also met with
reporters and accused Bonner of being an “advocate
journalist” for the rebel cause. Hinton’s complaints
gave the final blow to Bonner and The New York
Times’s reputation.45
Bonner Put at Odds with The New York Times
Six months after the Wall Street Journal opened
the criticism of Bonner, A. M. Rosenthal removed
Bonner from El Salvador, instructing him to return to
the Metro desk in New York. The Times seemed to have
succumbed to government pressure, explaining
Bonner’s withdrawal. Rosenthal’s public excuse for
removing Bonner was that he apparently had never
      43 Irvine, 2.
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Civil War: 1980 to 1983”, Association for Education in Journalism
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completed full training in the Times’ reporting meth-
ods.46 More specifically, Rosenthal explained that
Bonner “didn’t know the techniques of weaving a story
together.”47 However, Seymour Topping, who was the
managing editor at the time, maintained that Bonner
performed top tier investigative journalism in El
Salvador.48 Topping’s issue with the correspondent was
that he needed more experience and better technique
in writing and qualifying his stories. Criticizing
Bonner’s technical qualifications echoed the State
Department and Wall Street Journal’s attack; and
considering that Bonner successfully provided writing
on the physical evidence and civilian testimonies from
Mozote, the Times most likely moved him for political
reasons. Bonner entered Mozote using the wrong
people (the FMLN) and reported the wrong side of the
story. He reported well but also exposed dangerously
controversial evidence on a massacre performed by
U.S. funded and trained Salvadoran soldiers. 
Raymond Bonner eventually left the New York
Times in 1984. Despite his profound reporting on the
El Mozote Massacre (in conjunction with Alma
Guillermoprieto), Times correspondents reported less
critically on U.S. involvement in the civil war after
Rosenthal removed the reporter “out on a limb.” The
withdrawal sent a clear message as to how the Reagan
Administration dealt with outspoken critics. When
confronted with discordant information on El Salva-
dor’s murders, such as the El Mozote Massacre, the
Reagan Administration argued against sources’ reli-
      46Danner, 138.
      47 Ibid, 138.
      48 Ibid, 138.
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ability, typically labelling them as leftist. Since the
State Department lacked evidence to support its own
claims, it resorted to dodging the facts and reinforcing
the Reagan Cold War doctrine. Additionally, the
administration called upon Reagan-friendly press to
reinforce a pro-Salvadoran government image and
smear more critical media. Together, the Reagan
Administration and right wing newspapers pressured
the New York Times into removing Raymond Bonner,
a critical reporter on Salvadoran human rights.   
The Reagan Administration’s Continued Role in El
Salvador
The Reagan Administration continued funding the
Salvadoran government for the remainder of the civil
war. Congress would not reject the succeeding aid
certifications even though many members, like those
in the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
opposed funding a regime that eventually murdered a
total of about 75,000 innocent civilians by 1992.49 The
FMLN, which also killed noncombatants, was found
guilty of 400 murders by the UN Truth Commission of
1993.50 Even though Mexico and France had recog-
nized the FMLN as a political entity capable of negoti-
ating peace in 1981, the U.S. government chose to
prolong the war with military aid.51 Ultimately, the fear
of an FMLN victory restrained Congress from rejecting
President Reagan’s aid approvals. A “communist”
      49 Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “In Central America,
Reagan Remains A Polarizing Figure” Washington Post, (June 10,
2004).
      50 Ibid.
      51  Baloyra, 38-39
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victory could have undermined the Reagan Administra-
tion’s policy of spreading democracy by funding the
rightest Duarte Junta. Furthermore, an FMLN victory
could have demonstrated that a Marxist-inspired
movement was capable of defeating a U.S. backed
military and establishing its own independent govern-
ment. Moreover, in the event of a rebel victory, Con-
gress members who opposed funding El Salvador’s
military coups would have taken a heavy blame.
Consequently, the war continued, and the Reagan
Administration continued discrediting evidence of its
ally’s human rights violations; and atrocities like the
El Mozote Massacre would conveniently slip out of
recent memory.     
Conclusion
The Mozote incident demonstrated how the Reagan
Administration discredited evidence that contradicted
its framing of the war. When newspapers and human
rights organizations criticized the military coup or the
U.S. government, the U.S. Embassy and State Depart-
ment downplayed human rights abuses and denied the
credibility of the reports. When Congress used such
reports against the Reaganites, the State Department
altered the facts and even fabricated figures that were
more compatible with its own portrayal of El Salvador’s
human rights record. In attempts to sway Congress,
State Department officials argued that reporters who
proposed discordant information were leftwing rebel
sympathizers and therefore unreliable. Moreover, the
administration influenced the right-leaning press to
criticize newspapers, such as The New York Times and
Washington Post, since they revealed evidence of
government violence. Ultimately, the Reagan Adminis-
96 Historical Perspectives September 2015
tration’s shrewd and persistent actions against its
critics reflected its preoccupation with suppressing the
perceived communist threat in El Salvador. False
reports and press manipulation were employed to
preserve “democracy” or political hegemony in Central
America even if the  regimes supported by the United
States oppressed their civilian populations.
Héctor Navarro plans to graduate in 2017 with a major
in History.
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